Jan 6, Abstract: Inter-governmental relations in Nigerian federation entails formal transformation and delivery of social services to the people. Studies of inter-governmental relations are generally country-specific. The analysis of the relationship in the People also read. Article. Two types of multi‐ level. Inter-governmental relations in Nigeria entails formal allocation of powers . is a viable tool for rural transformation and delivery of social service to the people.
Their interdependence is seen to rest on the degree of dependency they have on one another for the proper fulfilment of their constitutional functions -- and their inter-relatedness is defined as the duty of each to co-operate with the other in mutual trust and good faith.
There are, however, inherent tensions in the power relations which the Audit has not overlooked. Theoretically, the concept provides for a structure in which all three spheres co-ordinate their actions in such a way as not to infringe on the integrity of any of the other spheres.
In practice the relationship is far more sensitive. For example, at one level there is the duty of the national and provincial spheres to empower, and at another level, to intervene, as shown in the section on the supervision of Local Government and the complexities of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. Co-operation is thus central to the system. The instruments of IGR facilitate this and reflect the concept of co-operative government whose principles underline the predominance of the national interest and require from each sphere that it respect the constitutional status, powers and functions of the other spheres.
The Instruments of Intergovernmental Relations: The co-operative government framework described above is what determines the distinctive features of the instruments of IGR and sets them apart from comparative, more conventional conceptions.
Accordingly, the emphasis of the Audit has been on identifying the weaknesses of the existing structures, strengthening the mechanisms for intergovernmental co-operation and seeking ways to mediate tensions so as not to impair the integrity of the spheres but to elevate their overall unity.
The Audit recognised that reform or regulation in itself might not lead to dramatic improvements in performance as poor IGR co-ordination is frequently a problem of capacity and management rather than a problem of inappropriate intergovernmental relations.
The instruments examined in depth comprised those so far developed in an evolving system of IGR. They are at once the institutions and actors in the system -- assessed according to the efficacy of their interaction between the spheres and within them for planning and integrated development.
The instruments included, first, the executive branch of government and second, the legislative, which has its own role of developing co-operation between the national assembly and the provincial legislatures, through the National Council of Provinces. Where formerly the IGF was seen as the instrument at the apex of the intergovernmental relations system, it was, in the view of the Audit Team, an early instrument of IGR whose structure and functions were mutually incompatible.
The Audit examined it closely. Although the restructuring of the presidency has provided the strategic architecture to integrate development planning through its intersectotal cluster committees and cabinet offices, there is still considerable need to develop adequate linkages between these and the IGR instruments for the greater coherence of the system.
Similarly the creation in June of the Department of Provincial and Local Government has enabled the national government to improve its monitoring and oversight capacity and, through the department, provide greater strategic direction for intergovernmental co-operation.
As indicated in the Audit, this arrangement was more sustainable than replacing the representation afforded by the IGF with any other forum at the centre of the system. The PCC, for instance, among others, technically assisted by the six inter sectoral committees in the Cabinet Office would therefore jointly have the responsibility of advancing the culture of co-operative governance. The recommendations [referred to below] to enact enabling legislation for their regulation is to provide a framework for their activities without imposing an inflexible regime upon them.
Assymetry in the design of regulation was possible so long as it was not inconsistent with the general principles underlying the proposed legislation. The practice of supervision and support The Audit Team noted the failure at the provincial level to develop the necessary co-operative government framework, although an encouraging sign of progress was the Memorandum of Understanding between the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature and the Eastern Cape Local Government Association which ,if acted upon, would regulate their interaction with Organised Local Government and, in so doing, encourage emulation by other provinces for improved co-operation with municipalities and metros.
In assessing the practice of monitoring, support and intervention by provinces, the Audit assessed the use of Section of the Constitution and the obligation of the province to oversee the capacity of local government to deliver services effectively.
The role and oversight function of the NCOP were equally addressed.
The case studies on Tweeling in the Free State and Warrenton in the Northern Cape Province, provide insights into the role, relations [with province and NCOP] and the capacity of organised local government to discharge its services responsibly A number of general conclusions flowed from the study, notably [in respect of the intervention in Warrenton] that with a proper monitoring system and use of the right measures of support, the intervention could have been prevented.
The case of Tweeling, in the Free State was an example of political and administrative mismanagement on the part of the TLC. Among the lessons learned from the case study was that in this instance the intervention also could have been prevented, if the provincial department had understood its supporting role better and adopted the problem-solving role played by the NCOP after the intervention.
The relationship between the states and the federal government (article) | Khan Academy
Recommendations for the national supervision of provinces and conclusions drawn from the case studies extend the scope of IGR. Since this function is exercised by all three components of government, the NCOP is regarded by the Audit Team as an important instrument for giving effect to intergovernmental relations.
Moreover, its powerful review function — scrutinising specific national and provincial executive actions affecting the distinctiveness of another sphere, with the power to overturn or approve those actions -- makes its role in IGR significant. The Audit was critical of the NCOP at a number of levels, noting its functional overload, limited resources and dis-empowering legislative process.
The consideration of Section 76 bills was seen to be its pre-eminent role and the one for which it was best equipped and structured. The substance of the critique in respect of overload, is that the NCOP is inundated with work due to its broad mandate in which it scrutinises both Section 75 and 76 bills. As special delegates play little part in the committee system, the scrutiny of all bills rests with only the permanent delegates. The problem is compounded by the smaller 30 member provincial legislatures, where approximately half the members are free to do Committee work.
The legislatures simply do not have the resources to cope with the exacting demands of legislative scrutiny or to deal with bills expeditiously within the legislative cycle. Hence there is hardly an opportunity for a considered view to be heard from the provincial legislatures. Respondents felt that little value was added to the debate and the NCOP appeared to them as simply a "rubber stamp" of the National Assembly.
In its oversight function the NCOP had not carried out its role as competently as it is required to do. The internal organisation of the Select Committees was found to be seriously wanting in regard to their management and the issues to be probed.
Intergovernmental Fiscal relations The Audit Report maps out the constitutional responsibilities of the spheres in their fiscal relations and the inherent tensions in the system — reflecting the conceptual inconsistencies in the power relations between the spheres [referred to earlier in the Audit]. In elaborating the financial framework provided by the constitution for the provinces, this section considers the question of revenue raising — primarily reserved for national government but balanced by the provincial right to its equitable share.
A critical review of the provincial intergovernmental fiscal institutions is provided, dealing with their roles and functions, alignment, and sequencing and inconsistencies in the intergovernmentaL budget process.
Policy options for improving provincial fiscal relations call for a re-assessment of the roles and responsibilities of provincial and national goverbnment with regard to concurrent functions to bring consistency into the process and set norms, standards and policy objectives. A reassessment of the present revenue assignment is recommended, including increased taxation powers at provincial level. Monitoring, co-ordination and alignment are seen as important in accelerating budget reform and improving co-ordination.
An innovative aspect of this section of the Audit is the discussion on Key indicators -- both Outcome and Processed based -- for measuring the health of IGR. The Settlement of Intergovernmental Disputes: The final section of the Audit refers to the avoidance of legal proceedings against one another, by the spheres. This is a duty imposed by the Constitution.
Whilst the latter foresees the likelihood of a breakdown between and within spheres, it imposes a duty on organs of state, in the event of a dispute, to exhaust all other remedies before approaching a court.
An act of Parliament is required under S 41 2 b of the Constitution to provide for such alternative[non judicial] mechanisms. The Audit addresses these and recommends that legislation be delayed. It sees no compelling urgency to enact this legislation. Moreover, delay might allow best practices to emerge which can later be captured in effective legislation.
The duty to exhaust all procedures before resorting to judicial remedies will obviously continue to apply. Sectorally-based legislation is however encouraged for settling disputes within a sector [vide the National Environmental Management Act]. Such legislation is essentially issue-sensitive and can give content to a normative framework in terms of which disputes can be settled.
The recommendations that follow encapsulate this approach. The recommendations of the Audit appear below as a separate section to this summary. The following are the main recommendations of the Intergovernmental Relations Audit. The chapters referred to appear in the same order in the Final Report. Instruments of intergovernmental relations 2.
During the course of the audit, a process of review of the IGF was under way. As an inclusive body, the IGF was initially seen to be important for consultation between provincial and national government. Potentially it was well placed to facilitate planning and co-ordinate the activities of the three spheres of government.
Since it brought together most of the top leadership in the country, it was important for receiving rather than sharing information and should have provided opportunities for networking beyond the confines of political parties. It did, however, serve as a forum for members to receive information on important, often sensitive issues, requiring more inter-governmental consultation, co-operation and co-ordination than the forum was able to provide.
On the whole, the Audit Team found that it failed as a multilateral, intergovernmental, policy-planning body upon whom government could rely for support, advice and the implementation of its development programme. The first meeting should be used by the President to set out the priorities of government and these should be filtered down to the national, provincial and local levels. The purpose of the second meeting should be to review progress of objectives set out in the first meeting.
In this way, "the IGF should be used as an instrument to co-ordinate government programmes and enhance and add value to Cabinet decisions.
In addition, the new Council would need to include in their brief the terms of reference appropriate to the extensive executive authority prescribed for premiers by the Constitution S  and ; S  and . In order to achieve this, the PCC will perforce create new linkages with the other intergovernmental relations for a, such as the MINMECs, statutory co-ordinating institutions and other bodies.
Given the experience of the previous forum, this is unquestionably a priority. The reference point for the new forum is the constitutional responsibility of premiers to exercise their executive authority together with their Excos to promote good governance in the province.
Inter alia, this involves the development of provincial policy, championing development and the administration of key concurrent functions shared with the national government. What separates the national-provincial forum from the previous body is its emphasis on these core activities within a co-operative government framework. An important feature of this framework is the formal responsibility of premiers to use their executive authority to ensure the delivery of services through co-operative interaction with local government.
The flow of information between provincial and national departments is one of the serious problems raised by respondents. The recommendation see below for an Act to regulate IGR structures is designed to address this. While section 41 2 of the Constitution requires an Act of Parliament to "establish or provide a structure and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations", it does not specify when this legislation should be enacted, or prescribe its nature.
Such legislation should be broadly enabling and set out such basic requirements as terms of reference, membership, criteria for compliance, technical support structures, and the assignment of responsibility for compilation of agendas, minutes of meetings, regular reports, a consultative process, linkages with other sectors, clusters and fora, and reports to provincial Excos and the Cabinet Office.Raised Without Gender
Communication and information between the MINMEC structures, the provincial executive committees, appropriate national departments and the Presidency should be a requirement. As the Act should be enabling, rather than prescriptive, regulation may be applied asymmetrically for each structure, provided that it is not inconsistent with the legislation. While the requirements of the sector will determine specific objectives, the Act would establish general criteria such as would require MINMECs to act as a means of co-operation, alignment and co-ordination of policies, and to facilitate the interaction of national and provincial government and, wherever applicable, in local government, according to the principles of Section 41 of the Constitution.
It is recommended that the proposed legislation require MINMECs to include mechanisms for the settlement of potential disagreements in the regulations governing their procedures.
Accountability should include the relevant portfolio committee s to ensure that the structure works in a way that best served the sector and its related parts, within a co-operative governance framework.
However, the proliferation of structures needs to be co-ordinated to avoid duplication and to ensure linkages with other IGR fora. The proposed legislation should address the above and help to co-ordinate the system. Attendance tended to fluctuate with the relevance of the MINMEC to the activity of the sector as a whole, the opportunity-cost of attending in terms of value added, and the logistical difficulties for MECs where their portfolios were not configured to deal with a single sector, as was the case with the national departments.
Regulation alone would not remedy this. Effective management, proper sequencing of meetings and a co-operative style of management are necessary to ensure the success of IGR structures. The personality and style of the minister are also important. It is recommended see above that the proposed legislation to regulate IGR structures require MINMECs to include mechanisms for the settlement of potential disagreements in the regulations governing their procedures.
As decisions are not constitutionally binding on the parties to MINMECs, the effect of a dispute is to prevent recommendations from being unanimous, with particular implications for the alignment of policy, integrated development planning and service delivery. It is rare although not unknown that a recommendation would be made without due consensus. In the view of the Audit Team, disputes were manageable provided there were mechanisms to resolve them.
The proposed legislation is designed to address this. The Budget Council 2.
The experience of these structures should be of importance when new structures are created or existing MINMECs formally established according to the proposed legislation. Note should be taken of the considerable groundwork required before binding instruments into statutory structures and the experience of the Budget Council in this respect is instructive. Before this body became a statutory instrument a team was established, then legislation was passed. From it flows a sustained pressure for efficiency gains that translate into either service extension or service improvement.
In order to install appropriate monitoring systems, it is important to ensure that information systems are put in place that will enable information on service delivery to be linked with information on financial flows.
Inter-governmental relations and planning in government
Proper costing systems need to be developed and fed into the Budget Council. These would analyse the budgets of departments, oversee spending patterns and identify early warning signals of potential financial crises. They would also have a monitoring function. The role of the FFC needs further clarification and its contact with provinces needs to improve. A diminished role is recommended as indicated below. Its five cluster committees were established to facilitate this.
Translated into practical activity at a narrower level, this meant promoting co-ordination between national and provincial departments on policy implementation and passing on expertise and advice to Cabinet and Exco respectively. Essentially, this referred to its expertise and ability to advise government on interdepartmental or transversal matters of policy, service delivery, financial issues and information dissemination.
In the view of the audit, this would duplicate the activities of the intersectoral Cabinet committees and, to some extent, the respective technical units of the Cabinet Office.
It would also be expensive. It is recommended that the role and structures of FOSAD be revisited and that its meetings be reduced to biannual sessions to provide guidance to public sector management and to facilitate the sharing of information on best practice. It could continue to review strategic direction of cross-cutting issues, and submit recommendations to the Cabinet structures on monitoring policy alignment.
Its structure should reflect its new functions. Rather than being purely technical, it should concern itself with serious strategic management and its approach should be efficient governance generally, not performance management.
The latter should be left to the minister. In summary, it should do the following, but not duplicate the activities of the Cabinet committees: See Chapter 3 on the Practice of Supervision and Support.
The Association was seen as ineffectual for a range of reasons — political, financial, and because of its lack of capacity to facilitate co-operation between provinces and municipalities.
There is, in fact, a general dissatisfaction among local government regarding the intergovernmental co-operation between provinces and municipalities. In some cases there is little interaction between organised local government and the province because of political differences.
Lack of capacity to address some of the major problems confronting local government is the cause of the problem. Some respondents also remarked upon the preparation of local government representatives who attend the MINMEC meetings. SALGA needs to address this as part of its programme to build internal capacity. The absence of structured relationships between local government and the provinces has resulted in the programmes and policies not being co-ordinated and aligned.
Many provinces tend to act as "big brother". Many respondents expressed the view that it should be appreciated that both levels of government are important in the governance process.
The absence of an effective working relationship between the provinces and the provincial local government associations does not help this.
There are few linkages between the provinces and local government on growth and development. For example, there is very little interaction if any with regard to the formulation of IDPs.
- Inter-governmental relations and planning in government
In the summation of the era up toAdebayo It was therefore natural that career administrators should step into the vacuum and exercise increasing influence on policy making In the Federal Government during the same period, The trend of change however indicated the use of Federal Might and Regional cohesion and disunity to achieve much of the articulated political re-engineering rather than a properly devised and acceptable political change to all the political actors in the ruler-ship and the opposition of the Nigerian State.
Under the Constitution, an elaborate provision for the payment of certain percentage of revenue from Distributable Pool Account of the Federation to the Regions began from accruals of excise duties, export and import duties, mining royalties and rents. Revenue formula put in place the following characteristics in distribution of Federal Allocation among States: The Republican Constitution was designed to promote all Inclusive Hierarchical Inter- dependent IGR Model with the creation of more spheres, that is, the acquisition of the capacity to create more regions i.
The Hierarchical Inter-dependent IGR Model is an elaborate relations in the federal system which manifest Federal Might, a dominating and domineering capacity where coordinate governments and constituent units are hierarchically structured and interdependent of one another in a relationship between the Federal and Regional National-States units. This is drawn from the need to centralise and define scope of state powers and to strengthen the weakened layers in the Federal-State relations and her administrative structures.
Administration Nigeria translated under the constitutional changes in into a country with a powerful Central Government whose Federal parliament exercise powers to make laws for the country, while the Federal Executive Council Council of Ministers executed Federal legislations. Postal Services, Transportation i. Though the Constitution provided for a Concurrent Legislative List that defines the rights of Federal and Regional Government to make laws on specific areas of interest, it however indicated that wherever the Federal and Regional legislatures clash in the enactment or interpretation of laws, the morality and decision of the Federal Government shall prevail, as it relate to issues of inter-states conflict, creation of Universities, prisons, Labour issues, Drugs and Poisons and enactment of Public Order.
The only areas where the Regional State Government could make law without recourse to the Federal authorities were in the issue of creation of schools, hospitals, forestry and agriculture, customary laws and local government system.
The responsibilities of the Federal Government was to work for the total interest of the Nigerian State without exploiting or enlisting the parochial interest of any group or region at the expense of the other, while the Regional Governments were expected to pursue their regional administration without interference in Federal Government or with one another in a manner that could prejudice the continuous existence and Constitution of the Nigerian State.
As the Public Service exist in the Federal Level, so did it existed in the Regional Levels with each levels creating administrative structures relevant for the effective implementation of governing process and undertaking institutional responsibilities. The Local Government system adopted in the Federal Capital Territory of Lagos which was re- designated as Abuja in resembled the structure operated in Western Nigeria, though the Lagos City Council was under the direct supervision of Federal Minister of Lagos Affairs whose administrative work were performed through Local Government Inspectors from the Ministry.
The above layers of IGR platforms at the Regional State levels existed within that period of and upward till when unified Local Government System was introduced in Nigeria.
It was a period when Local Administrations were entrenched and sustained through Regional Laws and Government controls at regional levels and was largely under existing regional political structures and affiliated local interest. The types of Local Administration established in the various Regions even after the Regions were effectively replaced with creation of 12 States structure at the end of the civil war in is as follows: It was a political structure where the appointment of Council Members at the Local Government level was tenure based in principle, though it was subject to political manipulation and controls under specific Government Ministers.
The Regional Government were obviously tele-guiding the Local Government System because it undertook the supervision in the appointment of Council officials. The Local Government system having been inherited from the Colonial administration and translated to the Regional Governments, had their accounts checked by the Audit Department of the Regional Government while the enactment of bye-laws into law by Councils required the approval of the Regional Government.
Conclusion The ultimate direction of IGR platforms by was the decentralization achieved in the sharing and use of powers between the Federal and the Regional State Governments which transits to a less centralized but more powerful federal state. The responsibilities of each layers of government were to ensure the continuity of the Nigerian State at the behest of the ruling class interest.
The dominant role which the federal Permanent Secretaries came to play in policy during the military rule until was a carry-over and confirmation of the influence which they had already established in the civilian era. The role of ethnicity as the dynamics for planning and executing National development plans b. Arrogation of Federal Might to the Central Government in a manner that subsumed the role of Regional Governments in a balanced federating structure c.
The inequality of States Regions in size, scope of representation and derivatives of federating benefits d. Regionalization of public service and approaches to public policy making and administration e.